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In the communist period, the Soviet republics could be regarded as a kind of pseudostates or 
protostates, which had some of the trappings of true states, but lacked essential elements such 
as control of their own territory and economy. Today, the state authorities in the successor 
state are striving to transform these political contraptions into real, functioning, modern states. 
This a complex and multidimensional process, and I do not intend to cover all of them. 
Instead, I will concentrate on the identity aspect of nation-building. In order to make these 
states functioning entities, it is essential that the people who live in them transfer their 
political loyalty to the new state. They must develop a sense of belonging in the state and a 
common identity as the People of Latvia and the People of Kazakhstan, in other words, as a 
Latvian nation and a Kazakhstani nation. At the present, all Soviet successor states are in the 
grips of hectic nation-building.  
 
The classical literature on nation-building which originated in the West in the 1960s and 
1970s, often assumed that the development of modern communication technologies, 
standarized educational systems, etc., more or less automatically would undermine local 
particularism and all kinds of substate, sectarian, and parochial identities, and supplant them 
with common, state-centered identities.1 It seems now quite clear that this optimism was 
unwarranted. Even in the Western world many old, long-established states are experiencing a 
backlash of regionalism and ethnic separatism. Nation-building seems to be a very protracted 
process at the best, perhaps even a never-ending project. Importantly also, the element of 
conscious policy decisions and state initiatives is stronger than many analysts believed. 
Therefore, in order to understand and to forecast what kind of nations that will take shape in 
the new states of the former Soviet Union it is important to focus on the express objectives 
and actual strategies of the nation-builders.  
 
Historically, in Eastern Europe in general and in the Soviet Union in particular, the concept of 
the ‘nation’ has not been identified with the total population of the country, as a political 
unit.2 Rather, it has been a cultural and ethnical entity. While in most Western countries the 
two terms of ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ are interchangeable, in the Soviet Union they were 
sharply differentiated. ‘Nationality’ was understood as ‘ethnicity’ and was objectivized, both 
on the individual level and on the macrolevel. Every Soviet citizen had an official nationality 
ascribed to him and written into his passport,3 and the territorial units which made up the 
Soviet federal state, were named after particular ethnic groups, the so-called titular 
nationalities. In some fuzzy sense these republics were seen as ‘belonging to’ the titular 
ethno-nations as collective, social bodies.4 This means that as the present-day nation-builders 
                                                 
1 See e.g.  Karl  Deutsch and W. Foltz (ed.), Nationbuilding, (New York: Atherton, 1966). For a scathing 
criticism of this position, see  Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism. The Quest for Understanding. (Princeton: 
Princeton University press, 1994). 
2  Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1946). 
3 When the Soviet passport regime was introduced in 1932, every passport holder was free to state which 
nationality s/he belonged to. Later, the element of  choice was abandoned.  
4 Rogers  Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1996).  
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in the Soviet successor states set out to mould new nations in the new states, there are already 
in existence a Latvian nation, a Kazakh nation, etc, but these groups are not coterminous with 
the total population of the state.  
 
All NIS states, then, are faced with the formidable task of relating these two entities, the 
titular nation and the People of Georgia, the People of Moldova, the People of Kazakhstan, 
etc, to each other in such a way that the entire population will freely identify with and be loyal 
to the state. Everywhere, the buzzword for the resolution of this task is ‘integration’. It is 
being asserted the national minorities that is, the members of the population who do not 
belong to the titular nation must be integrated into... well, it is not always quite clear exactly 
what they are supposed to be integrated into. Either they may be culturally integrated into the 
titular national culture, or they may be politically integrated into the state, in which case they 
will retain most of their cultural traits. Very often no explicit distinction between these two 
aspects of integration is made and a high degree of ambiguity surrounds the issue.  
 
This lack of clarity is perhaps not very consequential in all new states. In those countries 
where the titular nation constitutes 80% or even 90% of the total population, the character and 
the identity of the state will, inevitably, to a large extent be informed by the dominant ethnic 
culture. The small minorities are not in a position to challenge the hegemony of the titular 
group. For that very reason, perhaps, the titular group may feel secure enough to offer them a 
liberal, magnanimous minority policy, and the matter will not be coming to a head. Things are 
quite different, however, in those cases where the minorities make up sizeable, strong groups, 
capable of fighting for their collective interests. If there is strong cohesion not only within 
each ethnic minority, but also a high degree solidarity among them, the situation is further 
complicated still. In such cases, the non-titulars may, in theory at least, form a common front 
to curb eventual hegemonistic aspirations of the titular nation, and they will not so easily yield 
to pressure and to marginalization. In a worst case scenario this may lead to ethnic violence 
and a breakdown of social order. 
 
Potientially, this is the situation is we are faced with in Kazakhstan. With no more than some 
44% of the total population in Kazakhstan in 1994, the Kazakhs do not even constitute a 
majority, only a plurality. Also, in this state the minorities should not be regarded as a 
fragmented hotch-potch of disparate ethnic groups. While it is true that the various ethnic 
communities of Ukrainians, Tatars, Belarusians, etc. in Kazakhstan have retained some 
elements of their ethnic traditions, the vast majorities among them are nevertheless 
linguistically Russified, and in many cases also thoroughly Sovietized.5 For analytical 
purposes, therefore, it is more meaningful to identitfy the non-titular populations as a 
common Russified or Russophone group. This means that Kazakhstan is not really 
multicultural society, but may more aptly be characterized as a bi-cultural society.  
 
So, what exactly does integration mean in such bi-cultural societies? Is one half of the 
population supposed to be integrated into the other half? Is that at all possible, and if so, what 
will be the outcome? 
 
A multitiered debate. 
                                                 
5 Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia. The politics of National Identity. (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1995), p. 116. 
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These were core questions in a research project which was financed by the Norwegian 
Research Council in 1996, involving two Norwegian and one Kazakstani researchers. The 
project focussed on integration and nation-building on four different levels - ideological, 
political, social and mental. In this article I will concentrate on the ideological aspect, that is, 
on official and semiofficial statements outlining the idea of the Kazakhstani nation', as 
Kazakhstani nation-builders would like to see it develop.6 
 
In contrast to most other countries in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has a reasonably open debate 
in the media on many issues. To be sure, some topics are approached more gingerly than 
others and not all positions are tolerated, but it is nevertheless possible to trace the contours of 
a Kazakhstani thinking on integration and nation-building. This thinking, as will be 
demonstrated below, is far from coherent, but often contains several contradictory strands, 
sometimes expressed by the same authors.  
 
The Kazakhstani nation-building debate can be divided into three separate sections. At the 
ground level, the polemics include a wide variety of disparate viewpoints, among which also 
high-pitched nationalist positions are represented. For the most part, hard-line Kazakh 
nationalists vent their rancour in Kazakh language newspapers. These papers hardly any 
Russophones are able to, or care, to read. Excerpts from these outpourings, however, are 
sometimes translated into Russian and printed by Kazakhstani Russian language papers, in 
casu by Karavan, for the benefit of their monolingual Russophone readers. (This service, of 
course, not only keeps the readers informed but also, inevitably, may raise their level of 
anxiety). One extremist Kazakh nationalist paper, Kazakhskaia pravda, was for a while in 
1995 published in Russian, but was closed down for racist inflammation. After that closure, 
the Kazakh nationalist discourse seems to be ever more closely confined to the Kazakh 
language media. 
 
On the opposite side of the barricades, Russophone hardline positions will mostly be found 
in Russian media published in Moscow or in St.Petersburg. Russian language media in 
Kazakhstan are generally either pro-governmental or non-political. The only major 
exception, Karavan, represents a liberal rather than a nationalist opposition. However, in the 
irregularly published organ of the Russian community, Russkoe slovo, as well as in the 
Russian Orthodox journal Vedi, expressions of hardline, right-wing Russian nationalism may 
be found. The writings of such odious figures as Andrei Barkashov, Alexander Sterligov and 
the turn-of-century preacher John of Kronstadt are reprinted with approval.7 Hankering for 
the unitary Soviet state is expressed openly, and indirectly one can perhaps infer that the 
editors do not accept the legitimacy of the contemporary Kazakhstani state. However, this 
viewpoint is not explicitly stated. In these publications contemporary Kazakhstani interethnic 
                                                 
6 The term of a Kazakhstani nation (natsiia), while quite absent from the publication on the nationality issue in 
the Sovet period, is now frequently evoked. See for instance the statement of a group of Kazakh researchers at 
the semiofficial Institute for the Development of Kazakhstan: 'The  main objective of present state leadership [in 
Kazakhstan]  in the field of interethnic relations, is to create the proconditions, in a long-term perspective,  for 
the establishment of a unified Kazakhstani nation.' A.B., Galiev,  E. Babakumarov,   Zh. Zhansugurova  and A. 
Perushaev, Mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniia v Kazakhstane. Etnicheskii aspekt kadrovoi politiki. (Almaty:Institut 
razvitiia Kazakhstana 1994), p. 19. This and similar formulation in  modern Kazakh academic literature seem to 
reflect an exposure to Western terminology.  
7 See e.g. the article of Andrei Barkashev in Russkoe slovo,  1, 1996 (August) and the article of John of 
Kronstadt in Vedi  5, 1996. 
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issues are rarely addressed directly. While some issues such as the intra-ethnic zhuz question 
is semi-taboo in the Kazakh language discourse, in the Russian language alsoRusso-Kazakh 
relations are treated with discourse a high degree of self-sensure. This produces to rather lop-
sided debate in which sometimes very candid Kazakh outbursts on interethnic issues are met 
by Russophone reticence.  
 
Elevated about shadow boxing at the ground level hover the official statements of 
Kazakhstani authorities, embodied primarily in the dictums of the president and in the 
constitutional formulae. Nazarbaev's pronounced opinions on a subject are in a sense final. 
They are not open to overt criticism or disagreement in the public debate. Still, there is a 
certain leeway for interpretation and elaboration on his viewpoints. Also, the two Kazakhstani 
constitutions, from January1993 and August 1995 respectively, were exposed to a measure of 
lively debate prior to their adoption. However, as soon as they had been promulgated, attacks 
on them were muted. 
 
In between the official and the grassroots levels we find the academic discourse on 
integration and nation-building. This debate is to a large degree played out in small 
circulation journals which are not readily accessible to the public not so much because they 
are high-brow, but because they are simply not on sale at regular newsstands. Adding to the 
esoterics, certain politically sensitive scholarly reports are translated into English and sold for 
exorbitant prices in hard currency only. This precaution ensures that they will be read by 
foreign researchers (such or our team) but not by the average Kazakhstani citizens.8  
 
The Kazakhstani academic debate on ethnicity related issues is marked by a peculiar blend of 
refined scholarly finesse - or at least the trappings thereof - on the one hand and a sometimes 
rather rough-hewn nationalist message on the other. In style it clearly resembles the speeches 
of the president, in content, however, it is often perceptibly closer to the ramblings of the 
Kazakh nationalist press.  
 
THE GROUND LEVEL: THE KAZAKH LANGUAGE PRESS 
 
In the Kazakh language press the nationality debate seems to be premised on the view that 
this state is, or at least ought to become, a national state of the Kazakh nation. The fact that 
also very many non-Kazakhs inhabit the state is not necessarily seen as a valid reason for 
including them into the Kazakhstani concept of the nation 
 
In January 1996 a history professor wrote as follows in the newpaper Almaty aqshamy:  
 
How can we call those people 'Kazakhstanians' who arrived here some 40 or 50 years 
ago, or those whose forefathers settled here in the last century, when they pack their 
suitcases heading for Russia just because life is becoming slightly difficult (...). 
Unfortunately, we have millions of such people who where born and raised here, but who 
do not call Kazakhstan their Motherland.9 
                                                 
8 A prime example is Kazakh tribalism today, its characheristics and possible solitions (analytical report) . 
(Almaty: Institute for  the development of Kazakhstan, 1996), which is one of the extremely few Kazakhstani 
publications that discuss the zhuz problem. This report we were able for obtain at  the Institute for  the 
development of Kazakhstan for 20 USD, an enormous price for most Kazakhstanians. 
9 Saken Dorzhekov in Almaty aqshamy, 15 January 1996. 
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Another professor, who had visited the United States, rejected the notion of a Kazakhstani 
multinational state. The distressing fate of the native Americans showed what such a state 
could lead to. ‘The Indians are an ethnos on the verge of complete disappearance. Perhaps this 
is what the political "smart alecks" want: the Kazakhs ought to go the same way as the 
Indians’.10 
 
David Laitin has pointed out that much of what is usually being interpreted as interethnic 
violence and antagonism, instead ought to be regarded as expressions of animosity and 
conflict within ethnic groups. Nationalist agitators are devoting much time and energy to the 
policing their own group to ensure that all members walk in step and non-one succumbs to the 
assimilation into alien cultures. Also, persons who stand outside the circles of power use 
nationalistic rhetoric to worm their way into them.11 
 
Much evidence suggests that this description fits well the situation in Kazakhstan. In the 
Soviet period the political as well as the intellectual elite among the Kazakhs was dominated 
by persons who had received a Russian language education and often had a better command 
of the Russian than of the Kazakh language.12 This Russified and Sovietized elite is the target 
of the most bitter attacts of the Kazakh nationalists.  
 
A local leader in the Kazakh cultural organization 'Qazaq tili' (= 'the Kazakh language') in 
1996 complained that 'one turns on the television and sees Kazakhs working in high offices 
speaking in Russian or speaking Kazakh in a very stuttering, clumsy way, having great 
difficulty with the pronunciation. If this is the behaviour of our best and brightest, what will 
then happen to our language? (...) First and foremost the Kazakhs themselves ought to show 
respect for the state language, there can be no question about it.'13 Another author suggested 
that 'Qazaq tili' ought to be given the power to conduct language tests of all applicants for 
important positions in the state apparatus, and the right to reject the application of anyone 
showing an insufficient proficiency in Kazakh.14 Such suggestions, of course, hit a raw nerve 
not only of the Europeans, but also of Russophone Kazakhs.  
 
 In April 1996, a third professor (once more an historian, they seem to be rather active among 
the publicists), lamented that  
 
Young aspiring Kazakhs studied in Russian schools and married a daughter of a non-
Kazakh family. These people were trusted by the old regime and they worked in 
responsible positions. Some of them enjoy respect to this very day.  
In most cases the mother in such mixed families would get the upper hand. The 
children would marry someone from her nationality and be inculcated its traditions 
and mores. Such people are Kazakhs in name only.15 
 
                                                 
10 Professor Kuliash Orazbekova, in Almaty aqshamy, 12 January 1996, cited in Karavan 19 January 1996. 
11 David D. Laitin: Identity in formation. The Russian-speaking population in the Near Abroad, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University press, forthcoming). 
12 Martha Brill1 Olcott, The Kazakhs, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995.) 
13 K. Abdenov, in Eremen Qazaqstan, 2 February 1996. Cited in Karavan 9 February 1996. 
14 Cited in Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 10 April 1996. 
15 U. Shalekenov, in Eremen Qazaqstan, 3 April 1996, cited in Karavan 12 April 1996. 
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In this article, the concept of the Kazakh nation has been severely circumscribed. It no longer 
embraces all those who have 'Kazakh' as their passport nationality, but only those who have a 
good command of the Kazakh language and no non-Kazakhs in the family. Another caustic 
attack against the Russophone Kazakhs was published in Qazaq adebieti, on 30 January 1996. 
 
What distinguishes a person who doesn't know the life of his nation, doesn't 
understand its language - the soul of the nation - from a British or an American? 
Nothing!.16 
 
If these viewpoints should gain wide acceptance in Kazakhstan, this would radically 
strengthen the hand of the 'true' Kazakhs over their somethat more cosmopolitan ethnic 
brethren in the competition for power and influence in Almaty.  
 
 
The handful of quotionds from the Kazakh language discourse referred above represent of 
course only a haphazard selection. They are quoted from Russian language sources, and we 
do not know whether the publishers for reason might have chosen to concentrate on the most 
outrageous outpouring of Kazakh nationalist. No claim of representativity, therefore, can be 
made. All we can say with certainly is that also such viewpoints are being set forth, and 
tolerated. In fact, one may wonder if not the gravest sin of the editor of Kazakhskaia pravda, 
which sealed the fate of his newspaper, might have been that he published in Russian, thus 




In general, the message conveyed by president Nazarbaev and reflected in official 
pronouncements of Kazakhstani state authorities is distinctly different from the rhetoric used 
in the unofficial, Kazakh language discourse on ethnicity and nation-building presented 
above. To be sure, Nazarbaev's thinking on the topic is far from pellucid. Martha Brill Olcott 
has remarked Nazarbaev has tried to avoid confrontation on the ethnic issue by asserting that 
Kazakhstan is both a multinational society and a homeland for the ethnic Kazakh at the same 
time.17 In a sense, he has tried to avoid making a choice between an ethnic and a civic state 
concept. The duality in the official Kazakh selfunderstanding was expressed by the 
Kazakhstani president in a speech to a congress of the 'Qazaq tili' society in November 1992:  
 
We should not forget that the sovereignty of Kazakhstan is in many 
ways special. First and foremost it is a peculiar synthesis of the national 
sovereignty of the Kazakhs and the sovereignty of the people of Kazakhstan in 
general as an ethnopolitical community.18 
 
This ambiguity was also quite apparent in the January 1993 constitution.19 The preamble 
opened with a reference to 'We, the people (narod) of Kazakhstan', clearly a non-ethnic entity. 
Many Russophones, however, were disconcerted by article 1 which hailed the Republic of 
                                                 
16 The writer Bolat Zhetekbai, cited in Karavan 9 February 1996.  
17 Martha Brill Olcott, 'Kazakhstan: a republic of minorities', Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds), Nations and 
Politics in the Soviet Successor states, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.  315.  
18 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 28 November 1992. 
19 See Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the former Soviet republics, (London: C.Hurst, 1995), pp. 248-50. 
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Kazakhstan as 'the form of statehood of the Kazakh nation (natsia).' A Russophone professor 
in Almaty claimed that 'in other words, "the people of Kazakhstan" means the ethnic Kazakhs 
only'.20 This was clearly a misreading. Nonetheless, official spokesmen maintained that 
whatever else Kazakhstan is, it is also a national state of the Kazakhs. This view has been 
reflected in several Kazakhstani laws and in other official documents. The law on citizenship, 
for instance, allows dual citizenship for ethnic Kazakhs living abroad but for no other 
groups.21 This special arrangement was defended as being necessary to redress the injustice 
done to the Kazakh nation in the Soviet period when hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs fled 
to China and Mongolia to escape collectivization. These groups are also granted special 
privileges in the law on immigration.22 
 
At a large conference in Almaty in May 1993, Nazarbaev fleshed out the main goals and 
elements of a new Kazakhstani state ideology. A major task, he declared, would be 'to combat 
every chauvinism, nationalism, and separatism'. This should be done by the inculcation of 
'Kazakhstani patriotism'. 
 
In the world there are quite a few states, even very prospering ones, 
which contain more different nations and nationalities than we have in 
Kazakhstan. In these countries patriotism is especially strongly developed. A 
devotional attitude towards the state symbols reigns in society. For instance, at 
the beginning of the school day, during the swearing in of a jury or an official, 
and at many other events and mass gatherings the state flag is flown and the 
national anthem played.23  
 
The nation-building model outlined here was undisputably civic, the prototype being the 
United States.  
 
Another landmark in Nazarbaev’s thinking on nation-building and ethnic integration was his 
remarkable speech to the Parliament on 9 June 1994. At this occasion, Nazarbaev not so much 
formulated lofty, positive ideals,but instead subjected the actual nation-building practices 
pursued by his own state apparatus to devastating criticism. He attacked as simplistic the 
conventional Kazakh view that Russians were leaving the country for economic reasons only.  
 
We should not close our eyes to the fact that very many people start to think about 
leaving the country the moment when they are beginning to feel a psychological 
discomfort. This feeling of theirs is caused by a number of factors, first and foremost 
related to excesses and an unreasonable speed in the implementation of complex socio-
cultural programs.  
 
This statement was so startling that Nazarbaev, anticipating accusations that he was being 
pressurized by someone (read: Russia), insisted that he had reached this conclusion quite on 
his own. His only motivation was his desire to set straight errors committed by state officials, 
in particular in the field of the language policy. The state program for the development of the 
                                                 
20 V. Moiseev, in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 27 August 1993. 
21 'Zakon o grazhdanstve respubliki Kazakhstan', Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta Kazakhskoi SSR, 1991,  52, 
pp. 81-96. 
22 'Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ob immigratsii' 1992.  Sovety Kazakstana, 25 August. 
23 Sovety Kazakhstana,  13 May 1993. 
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Kazakh language and other languages had disturbed not only the Russophone population but 
also many Kazakhs, the president complained. A new language law therefore ought to be 
adopted which would 'eliminate all and every discrimination of the Russian language’ at the 
same time as it would identify effective measures for the promotion of the Kazakh language.  
 
As particularly pernicious Nazarbaev singled out the 'destructive’ policy of changing Russian 
toponyms. 'The mass renaming of streets, towns and even major cities has had a one-sided 
tendency. It has not taken into consideration the public sentiment or the ethnic composition of 
the population. Sometimes it has disregarded even centuries-old traditions and, worst of all, it 
has ignored the mass psychology of the inhabitants.’ 
 
Belling the cat, Nazarbaev claimed that the problems he has detected were caused by 
'distortions in the personnel policy'. Such distortions could be found both locally and in the 
capital, he insisted. 'For instance, 30 Kazakhs as against only three Russians, two Uighurs 
and one Azeri are working in the Language committee. And this is an agency which deals 
with the development of all of our languages, not only with Kazakh.'24 
 
While Nazarbaev softened his criticism somewhat by pointing out an instance where also 
Kazakhs were grossly underrepresented in a state organ, his speech definitely conveyed new 
signals and left many of his listeners flabbergasted. A Russian nationalist, a leading activist of 
the Slavonic Lad movement in Eastern Kazakhstan, confessed that when he read this address 
he could not believe his own ears. Its message to a remarkable degree coincided with his own 
views, but if any one activist from Lad had voiced similar opinions, he or she would 
immediately have been accused of slander and of rousing interethnic animosity, this Russian 
surmised.25  
 
For a while, Nazarbaev's June 1994 address seemed to signal a new departure in the treatment 
of the non-tituar population  in Kazakhstan. 
The new constitution of May 1995 contained some significant semantic changes which 
Russophone activist had been clamoring for for a long time. The phrase defining Kazakhstan 
as 'the form of statehood of the Kazakh nation was deleted, as was the special right of the 
Kazakh diaspora to hold dual citizenship. Russian was elevated to a status of an ‘official’ 
language ‘to be used on a par with the state language in state organs and in organs of local 
administration’.26 This compromise formula most Russians regarded as an improvement over 
the previous constitution which defined Russian as a ‘language of interethnic 
communication’, but it fell short of their optimal goal: full parity of the Kazakh and Russian 
language in all official usages.27 
 
In May 1996 a new official ‘Concept for the Forming of a State Identity of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan’ was published in Kazakhstani media.28 The Concept, while performing a delicate 
                                                 
24 Nursultan Nazarbaev: K obnovlennomu Kazakhstanu - cherez uglublenie reform, obshchenatsional'noe 
soglasie. (Almaty: Kazakhstan, 1994), pp. 12-15.  
25  Nikolai Ivanov, 'Kazakhstan: sluzhenie khimere', Moskva,  12, 1994, pp. 135-150, on p. 146. 
26 'Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstan', Mysl' (Almaty),  10, 1995 pp. 3-22, articles 1, 7, 10 and 11. 
27 Appeals from UP nNORTH 
28 The document was unsigned, but the chairperson of the Parliament committee on Foreign Affairs, Zhabaikhan 
Abdildin, in interview with the author in October 1996 claimed to be the main architect. 
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balancing act between an ethnic and a civic idea of the nation, nevertheless must be regarded 
as a retreat from the studious ethnic neutrality of the 1995 constitution.  
 
The Concept noted that the ‘ethnic centre’ of the Kazakhs is Kazakhstan. Nowhere else in the 
world do Kazakhs possess a statehood which is concerned about the preservation of the 
Kazakhs as an ethnic group, or about the development of Kazakh culture, language, traditions, 
and life style. ‘When we define Kazakhstan as a national state, it is this quality of the state we 
primarily ought to have in mind.’ Acknowledging that Kazakhstan certainly is a multiethnic 
state, the Concept also stated that the other ethnic groups in the country could not adduce 
similarly strong claims to attachments to this state. ‘The changes in the national make-up of 
Kazakhstan have been brought about exclusively by an influx of non-Kazakh ethnic 
communities, the majority of whom have their own statehood (= elsewhere).’ 
 
Remaining a national state, Kazakhstan at the same time represents the interests of the entire 
population, irrespective of their ethnicity, the authors of the Concept declared reassuringly. 
This dual quality, they asserted, represents ‘the new essence’ of the Kazakhstani state.  
 
In June 1994, Nazarbaev had demanded the adoption of a new language law which would 
'eliminate all and every discrimination of the Russian language’. A new law was indeed 
adopted on 22 November 1996, but it was regarded by Russophone activist as a tightening of 
the discrimination against the Russian language. The law required, inter alia, ethnic Kazaks  
to know the state language by January 2001 while the Russian-speaking population must 
know Kazakh by January 2006. There were no requirements for proficiency in Russian. 
Michail Golovkov, the sole remaining Lad leader in the Kazakhstani parliament, 
characterized the xx as xx.29  
 
THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE 
 
The vacillations and ambiguities in official statements on issues related to nation-building and 
ethnic integration leave considerable latitude for inspired exegesis and imaginative 
interpretations. A lively and often sophisticated discourse on integration and related subjects 
is unfolding in Kazakhstani academiae. The main fora are journals such as Saiasat (Politics), 
Mysl’ (Thought), and Evraziiskoe soobshchestvo (the Eurasian community). The 
overwhelming majority of the participants in this discourse are (judging by their names) 
ethnic Kazakhs.  
 
Also a few Russians take part, and the few Russian contributions emphasize, predictably, the 
multicultural character of the state and try to hold forth a civic, inclusive state model. The title 
of a August 1995 article in Saiasat written by A. Kotov, a member of the consultative council 
preparing the new Kazakhstani constitution, asserted that ‘a Unified Citizenship is the 
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights in the Republic of Kazakhstan’.30 The edge of Kotov’s 
article was directed partly against Estonia and Latvia, where a large portion of the population 
was not granted status as original citizens at all, as well as against Russia, a country which has 
been pushing particularly hard for the institutionalization of dual citizenship. While Kotov in 
principle found the idea of dual citizenship strongly deleterious he nevertheless, surprisingly, 
                                                 
29 Golovkov's interview with the author, August 1996.  
30  A.K. Kotov,  'Edinoe grazhdanstvo -- konstitutionnaia osnova ravnopraviia v Respublike Kazakhstan', 
Saiasat, (Almaty)  3, 1995 pp. 21-25. 
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was willing to make an exception for Kazakhs living outside Kazakhstan. His acceptance of 
such positive discrimination of the Kazakh group either indicates that accommodation to 
Kazakh positions on ethnic issues is far advanced in the Russian academic community in 
Kazakhstan, or that such concessions are necessary to make in order to be admitted into the 
official discourse at all.  
 
By way of contrast it could be pointed to the fate of a textbook on political science written by 
a Russian lecturer at the local technical institute in Semipalatinsk in 1993. In his book, 
Anatolii Syromiatnikov noted that many former Soviet republics were so multinational in 
their ethnic composition that it was impossible to turn them into ‘national states’ in the ethnic 
sense of the word. ‘Attempts to confirm the rights of the indigenous populations only will 
lead to conflict situations such as armed clashes, increased instability, the disintegration of 
new states, as well as to mass migration and the tragedy of millions of people.’31According to 
Syromiatnikov his textbook had the dubious distinction of becoming one of the first scholarly 
books in independent Kazakhstan to be banned by the censorship.32 Syromiatnikov’s 
conflictology was formulated as a general theory, but its applicability to Kazakhstani 
conditions was obvious.  
 
No common position can be attributed to all Kazakh academic authors writing on the issues of 
integration and nation-building, but certain prevailing trends may nevertheless be identified. 
On the crucial question of the character of the Kazakhstani state a consensus seems to have 
formed: even if the idea of Kazakhstan as ‘the form of statehood of the Kazakh nation’ has 
disappeared from the Kazakhstani constitution, it is still alive and kicking among influential 
opinion makers in Almaty.  
 
The crucial question of civic vs. ethnic nation-state has been addressed in a spate of 
Kazakhstani articles. In April 1994, law professor S. Sabikenov tried to define the difference 
between ‘national’ (natsional’nyi’) and ‘popular’ (narodnyi) sovereignty. Such a clarification 
is very much needed, not only in Kazakhstan, but in many new states in the FSU area. The 
term 'self-determination of nations', which in international law relates to the independence and 
self-rule of states, the leads to great confusion in countries where the nation is regarded as an 
ethnic entity. However, Sabikenov's article did little to disperse the mist which clouds this 
terminology in the Kazakhstani debate.  
He concluded that ‘in character’ Kazakhstan is a national state of the Kazakh nation, but ‘in 
content’ it is a democratic, law-governed state. These two aspects, in his view, do not 
contradict each other.  
 
To my mind, a national state stems from the fulfilment of a nation’s right to self-
determination. In our case, this means the Kazakh nation, as the indigenous nation 
which has an historical and unalienable right to fulfil its right to self-determination on 
its own territory.  
 
                                                 
31 L.T, Tolubaeva and  A.L. Syromiatnikov, Lektsii po politilogii, (Semipalatinsk: Semipalatinskii 
tekhnologicheskii institut, 1993).  
32 Interview with Syromiatnikov in Semipalatinsk, 21 September 1996. See also Karavan, 15 June 1994.  
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Sabikenov therefore considered any attempt to delete from the constitution the reference to 
Kazakhstan as the homeland of the Kazakh nation as both unscientific and unjustified.33  
 
A somewhat different approach to the nation-building question was taken by G. 
Tanirbergenova, a local school administrator from Taldy Kurgan. She regarded the Kazakhs 
as ‘a state-forming nation’ (gosudarstvoobrazuiushchaia natsiia). As such, they were 
assigned with the loft task of fostering the spirit of Kazakhstani patriotism among the other 
nations inhabiting the vast Kazakhstani space. This was the historical mission of the Kazakh 
nation today, she believed.34 
 
A similar view was held by professor Adbumalik Nysanbaev. Writing with a junior colleague 
in Kazakstanskaia pravda in January 1996 he claimed that Kazakhstan ‘does not exhibit any 
positive idea, any significant aims, or common dreams capable of uniting and rousing all 
Kazakhstanians’, except one: ‘the Kazakh (kazakhskaia) idea’. ‘Today, when the Kazakh idea 
has been embodied in a sovereign state, it ought to acquire a new quality as the integrating 
principle of the entire polyethnic and polycultural people in our country.’35 Thus, the nation-
building process will encompass all inhabitants of Kazakhstan but their respective cultures 
will not in equal measure influence the end result. Instead, the core and essence of 
‘Kazakhstanianness’ will be ‘Kazakhness’.  
 
An article in the August 1995 issue of Saiasat addressed the issue of ‘interethnic integration 
in Kazakhstan’.36 The author, associate professor N. Baitenova at the Kazakhstani state 
university, regarded integration as the optimal solution to the ethnic problems of Kazakhstan, 
infinitely superior to the alternative solution of assimilation. Integration, however, would be a 
protracted process, she believed, fraught with conflicting tendencies. The end result would - 
hopefully - be the formation of ‘a Kazakhstani nation’. This nation would be held together not 
only by common statehood and citizenship, but also by shared cultural bonds. While all ethnic 
groups in Kazakhstan would retain their separate identities, they would nevertheless learn 
from and adopt to each other. In a process of mutual acculturazation they would develop ‘a 
distinctive mentality as Kazakhstanians.’ 
 
The major obstacle on the road towards this radiant future lay in the resistance of a large part 
of the Russian population of Kazakhstan, Baitenova believed. These people did not 
understand that after independence the two major groups, the Kazakhs and the Russians, were 
inevitably going through significant changes of status. 
 
From being in a subordinate position the Kazakh ethnos has been changed into a titular 
nation. As a result of the [state] souverenization, the Kazakh ethnos has rectified the 
historical injustice and restored their ancient right to their historical homeland, their 
soil, language, mores, and traditions. From being a ‘junior brother’, the Kazakhs have 
been turned into the leading ethnos, the indigenous nation. 
                                                 
33  S. Sabikenov, 'Natsional'nyi i narodnyi suverenitet. V chem ikh razlichie?', Mysl' (Almaty),   4,  1994, pp. 9-
11. 
34 G. Tanirbergenova, 'Regional'nyi opyt realizatsii vnutrennei politiki', Saiasat,   5, 1995, pp. 50-57. 
35 Abdulmalik Nysanbaev and Murat Abdirov, ‘Zachem nuzhna doroga, esli ona ne vediot k Khramu?’, 
Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 4 January 1996. 
36  N.D. Baitenova, 'Mezhetnicheskaia integratsiia v Kazakhstane: Sostoianie i perspektivy', Saiasat, (Almaty), 
3, 1995, pp. 27-33. 
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As a concomitant effect of the elevation of the Kazakhs the Russians have been reduced ‘from 
a status as the senior brother and are becoming an ordinary ethnos, or even better: they are 
acquiring the status of an ethnic group’. Some Russians, however, do not accept these new 
conditions, Baitenova complained. As a sign of this she pointed out that a leader of the 
Slavonic Lad movement in April 1995 had appealed to the voters not to endorse the 
prolongation of Nazarbaev’s term in office beyond the five year period he was elected for. 
Loyalty towards the Kazakhstani state was thus identified with support for present political 
regime.  
 
Baitenova noted with relief that certain Belarusian, Ukrainian and Polish spokesmen had 
criticized Lad for this stance, and she saw this as evidence of these nations’ greater loyalty. 
The political disagreements which she had detected within Slavic camp led her to the 
conclusion that the term ‘Russophones’ was imprecise and incorrect. Not the Russophones, 
but the Russians alone were the main opponents of the Kazakhs. Such an analysis drives a 
wedge into the Russophone groups and splits it into smaller, politically less powerful 
components.  
 
Banking on demography  
 
One of the favourite themes in the Kazakh nationality debate is demography. The Kazakh 
ethnic group grows considerably faster than the European groups for several reasons: 
increasing Kazakh immigration from abroud (in particular from Mongolia and China), 
increasing emmigration of Russian, Germans and other Europeans, and finally, a higher birth 
rate among the Kazakhs.37 Thus, according to official sources, the share of the Kazakh group 
increased from 39.7% in 1989, to 44.3% in 1994 and 46% by 1 January 1995. During the 
same period the share of the Russian fell from 37.7% to 34.8%; of the Germans, from 5.8% to 
3.1%.38 A Kazakh demographic dominance may be predicted to be in place in the course of a 
few years and to be gradually strenghtened in the first decade of the next century.  
 
In the Kazakhstani debate these figures and extrapolations are used to drive home two points. 
First, it will break the resistance of Russophone activists againt the Kazakhification of the 
state. second, it allegedly also justifies the present overrepresentation of Kazakhs in the state 
apparatus and in elected offices. The latter point is somewhat surprising, since one would 
perhaps expect the growth of 'ethnic power' (to use Rasma Karklins' expression)39, to follow 
the demographic tendencies with a time lag of one generations. After all, not infants but 
adults fill public offices. However, the political influence of the Kazakhs is clearly running 
ahead of the demographic weight.  
 
Several Western experts have concluded that as early as in the 1970s, several Soviet 
nationalities to an increasing degree were able to dominate the political scene in their 
                                                 
37 This is particularly true with respect to the rural Kazakhs, while second and third generation urban Kazakhs 
have a family structure which is more similar to the Russians'. This also has the effect of increasing the share of 
Kazakh speakers among the Kazakhs  at the expence of Russophone and bilingual Kazakhs. See Nurbulat 
Masanov, Evraziiskii vestnik XXX. 
38 O demograficheskoi situatsii v 1995 godu ,  (Almaty: Pravitel'stvo respubliki Kazakhstan, 1996), p. 66. 
39 Rasma Karklins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR. The Perspective From Below. (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 
1986/1989) 
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respective republics.40 The Kunaev regime in Kazakhstan is often singled out as a prime 
example of this tendency, in spite of the fact that during the entire Kunaev era the Kazakhs, as 
the only titular nationality in a Union republic, made up less than half of the total population. 
One reason for this seems to be the traditional clan structure of Kazakh society which the 
Soviets were never able to eradicate. As a legacy of pre-Soviet times, power and authority in 
Kazakhstan, like in most other Central Asian states, ran through time-tested clan structures. 
The three Kazakh superclans (zhuz’es) - the Great Horde, the Middle Horde and the Smaller 
Horde - compete among themselves for positions and influence. If a member of one group 
managed to climb high up in the hierarchy, he immediately sought to promote his own kith 
and kin to prestigious positions. Groups that did not have anyone in the bureaucracy to protect 
and help them, tended to loose out.41  
 
 The central authorities in Moscow, nevertheless made sure that the Russians and other Slavs 
in most cases got their fair share - in some sectors even a lion's share - of the top notch 
positions. After independence this external check was eliminated. In 1994 60% of the 
parliamentary seats were filled by Kazakhs. Only 49 Russians (28%) and 16 other Europeans 
(Ukrainians, Jews and Germans) were elected42. In 1995 26 Kazakhs and 12 Russians were 
elected/appointed to the Senate, while 42 Kazakhs, 19 Russians and 5 representatives of other 
nationalities took seat in the Lower House.43  
 
These discrepancies are readily acknowledged in a detailed and thorough analysis a group of 
researchers from the semi-official Institute for the Development of Kazakhstan on the 'ethnic 
aspects of the cadre policy in Kazakhstan.44 Their findings on the ethnic composition of the 
top echelons of executive officials in two key bureaucracies - the apparatus of the Cabinet of 




Many Western readers will no doubt see these figures as confirmation of a strong 
overrepresentation of the titular nation in Kazakstani politics. The Kazakh researchers who 
have compiled them, however, are of a different opinion. They claim that  
 
while the major ethnic groups have different degrees of representation in the examined 
structures, the differences are not so large that they give cause for concern. The 
dynamics of ethnic representation, in our view, goes in the same direction as the ethno-
demographic development in the country.45  
 
                                                 
40 Grey Hodnett,  Leadership in the Soviet National Republics. (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1979); Victor  
Zaslavsky,  ‘Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies’, Dædalus, 121, 2,  1992, pp. 
97-121.  
41 Pål Kolstø, "Nation-building in the former Soviet Union", Journal of Democracy 7, 1 1996, pp. 116-32. 
42 Central Asia Quarterly labyrinth,  1,  2, 1994, pp. 3-4. 
43 Bhavna Dave, 'A New Parliament Consolidates Presidential Authority', Transition     2,   6, (22 March 1996), 
pp 33-37. 
44  A.B., Galiev,  E. Babakumarov,   Zh. Zhansugurova  and A. Perushaev, Mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniia v 
Kazakhstane. Etnicheskii aspekt kadrovoi politiki. (Almaty: Institut razvitiia Kazakhstana, 1994). 
45 ibid, p. 43.  
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The fact that 'the dynamics of ethnic representation' are clearly running ahead of 'the ethno-
demographic development' is not emphasized.  
 
As mentioned, the higher birthrates of the Kazakhs are also by many Kazakh researchers seen 
as the main factor determining the future ethnic relations in Kazakhstan. In her August 1995 
article, N. Baitenova claimed that over the next 20 years the share of the Kazakh ethnos will 
increase to 80% of the total population while the Russian group would be drastically reduced, 
as a result of emigration and of low birth rates, she predicted.46 Outmigration of the Russians 
Baitenova considered as economically motivated only. This assertion was startling not only 
against the backdrop of her own theory of integration, but also since it flew in the face of 
Nazarbaev’s June speech in the Kazakhstani parliament from the year before.  
 
The topic of demography was taken up and further elaborated in the October issue of Saiasat 
by M. Tatimov, a senior member of the presidential analytical centre. With a terminology 
reminiscent of Oswald Spengler's culturology, Tatimov divided the nations of the world into 
‘young’ and ‘old’ by the criterion of their demographic development. A nation is ‘old’ if the 
older age cohorts dominate over the age groups of children and youngsters. In Tatimov’s 
typology both the Russians, the Balts, and the Ukrainians are old nations.  
 
Whenever two ‘old’ nations dominate on the same territory, they will tend to engage in a kind 
of ‘psychological cold war’ for control, Tatimov maintained. Kazakhstan, however, was in a 
much more favorable situation since one of the two competing nations in this country, the 
Kazakhs, is young. The Kazakhs, therefore, will win out without engaging the Russians in 
direct confrontation, just by biding their time. The ethnic battle, as it were, will be fought in 
the bed chamber, where the Kazakhs inevitably will be victorious.  
 
However, the Kazakhstani state authorities ought not to sit back smugly awaiting this happy 
outcome. Instead, they should actively strengthen the natural trends by ‘an effective 
demographic policy, supporting and promoting the full manifestation of the historically 
objective tendencies in the development of our population’. In addition, the state should 
pursue a migration policy geared towards the strategic aim of ‘consolidating the Republic of 
Kazakhstan as a young, unitary state.’  
 
The strong reliance on favourable demographic tendencies permeats Kazakh thinking on 
national integration. It is echoed, for instance, in a prognosis made by the demographer 
Azimbai Galiev. Forcasting a rapid decrease in the Russian population in the years to come, 
he concludes that ‘Russian emigration from Kazakhstan is likely to promote socio-economic 





                                                 
46 These figures are unrealistically high, but also Western analysts make predictions of drastic ethno-
demographic shifts in the years to come. Federica Moroni points out that 80% of the teenagers in Kazakhstan 
today are ethnic Kazakhs, and if present trends continues, Kazakhs will become a relative majority in the country 
by the year 2000, she estimates. Federica  Moroni, ‘A State in Transition. Security Issues in Kazakhstan’,The 
international spectator,   29,  4,  1994, pp. 29-53,  on p 32.  
47 Azimbai Galiev, 'Etnodemograficheskaia kartina Kazakhstana',  Novoe pokolenie,  15, 1996. 
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The Kazakhstani discourse on integration and nation-building is treating these subjects in the 
categories of the Soviet censuses. The passport entries are regarded as the basic identity 
markers. Emphasis on subethnical identities such as zhuzes and superethnic identities such as 
‘the Russophones’ are politically incorrect.  
 
Many Kazakh experts identify Russian-Kazakh (rather than Russophone-Kazakh) ethnic 
competition as a major problem of integration and social consolidation. This diagnosis, 
however, does not lead them to despair or to alarmism. On the contrary, the dominant mood 
seems to be closer to triumphalism. Kazakh intellectuals tend to rest assured that in this ethnic 
rivalry the Kazakh side will win out without taking recourse to any extreme measures. The 
decisive factor of time is one their side.  
 
In her article, N. Baitenova referred to a survey of expert opinions in which the majority of 
the respondents expected that ‘the Russian problem’ in Kazakhstani politics would find its 
solution within a couple of years. 36% of the experts in the survey based this optimistic 
prognosis on a growing consensus among the ethnic groups while 38% pinned their hopes to 
an expected acceleration of Russian outmigration, which would tip 'the balance of forces' in 
favour of the Kazakhs.48 
 
The sanguine views of the Kazakh researchers go against the grain of most Western analyses, 
which in later years have been predicting growing interethnic and intraethnic violence in 
Kazakhstan.49 In fact, the tranquility scenario of the Kazakh expertise may easily be stood on 
its head. If the Russophones are feeling that they are gradually loosing (demographic and 
political) strength vis-a-vis the titular nation, they may conceptualize the situation as a closing 
window of opportunity. They will have to act before it is too late.50 They must make a last-
ditch defence before they have become so numerically and politically weakened that they are 
no longer in a position to stem the ongoing Kazakhification. However, when or research team 
visited Almaty, Semipalatinsk, and Ust-Kamenogorsk in September 1996, we saw few signs 
of Russian or Russophone ethnic mobilization. Whether this shows that 'the window of 
opportunity' has already closed or we were witnessing the proverbial lull before the storm, we 
cannot tell.  
 
In a conversation with the author Murat Arenov, director of the Analytical-informational 
Centre in the Kazakhstani parliament, expressed a higher degree of concern for the future than 
the optimism that permeats most of the written Kazakhstani debate. Both the present ethnic 
balance and a disturbance of this balance might undermine the social peace, he believed. 
 
                                                 
48 N.D. Baitenova,  'Mezhetnicheskaia integratsiia v Kazakhstane: Sostoianie i perspektivy', Saiasat, (Almaty)   
3,  1995, pp. 27-33. 
49 Ian  Bremmer and Cory Welt ‘Kazakhstan’s quandary’, Journal of Democracy,   6,  3 (July) 1995, pp. 139-
154; Bremmer, Ian and Cory Welt, 'The trouble with democracy in Kazakhstan', Central Asian Survey, 15,  2,  
1996, pp. 179-200; Robert  Kaiser and Jeff Chinn, 'Russian-Kazakh Relations in Kazakhstan', Post-Soviet 
Geography,   36,   5, 1995, pp. 257-273. 
50  David D. Laitin, Identity in formation. The Russian-speaking population in the Near Abroad, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University press, forthcoming).  It is also interesting to note that in 1993 a Cossack deputy to the Kazakhstani 
Supreme Soviet, xx, saw the equal strength of the two main cultural groups in Kazakhstan as one of the basic 
preconditions explaining the virtuel absence of  ethnically motivated bloodshed in country. Since neither group 
could hope to prevail over the other, both were inclined to compromise and accomodate. See Rossiiskaia gazeta, 
20 February 1993. 
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'In Kazakhstan today, Russians and Kazakhs are engaged in a constant competition in all 
social spheres, in administration, science, culture, business and language' Arenov maintained. 
As long as the ethnic balance was retained, both parties would keep a high alert. ‘When a 
struggle between two equal rivals are taking place, both sides will feel that they have enough 
strength left and they will not yield to the other side.’51 At the same time Arenov admitted 





At least three levels of the Kazakhstani nation-building debate may be distinguished, and 
different varieties of the concept of the 'nation' dominate on each of them. Perhaps this 
concept may be compared to an iceberg: the official documents and the presidential 
statements make up the small tip that protrudes above the surface and is visible from afar. 
These proclaim a supraethnic nation-state with few special rights for the titular nation. Less 
known is the thinking on Kazakhstani nation-building which enfolds in the Kazakh language 
press and in the academic journals. Here, ethnic cultural renaissance and political nation-
building are often commingled.  
 
 
51 Author's interview  with Mikhail Golovkov in Almaty, 17 September 1996.  
